ABSTRACT Internet of Things (IoT) technologies have been broadly applied in smart grid for monitoring physical or environmental conditions. Especially, state estimation is an important IoT-based application in smart grid, which is used in system monitoring to get the best estimate of the power grid state through an analysis of the meter measurements and power system topologies. However, false data injection attack (FDIA) is a severe threat to state estimation, which is known for the difficulty of detection. In this paper, we propose an efficient detection scheme against FDIA. First, two parameters that reflect the physical property of smart grid are investigated. One parameter is the control signal from the controller to the static Var compensator (CSSVC). A large CSSVC indicates there exists the intense voltage fluctuation. The other parameter is the quantitative node voltage stability index (NVSI). A larger NVSI indicates a higher vulnerability level. Second, according to the values of the CSSVC and NVSI, an optimized clustering algorithm is proposed to distribute the potential vulnerable nodes into several classes. Finally, based on these classes, a detection method is proposed for the real-time detection of the FDIA. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme can detect the FDIA effectively.
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through analyzing the monitoring data and the power system topologies. The outputs of state estimation are some immeasurable state variables like the voltage amplitude values and voltage phase angles, which can be used as the input of many EMS (Energy Management System) applications, i.e., the power dispatch, accident analysis, power flow analysis. Therefore, state estimation is an important application to assist the smart grid to operate safely and reliably.
In Fig. 1 , the illustration of FDIA in smart grid is shown. The attackers may inject the falsified monitoring data by three means: compromising the smart meters, sensors or RTUs; hijacking the communication between sensor networks and the SCADA system; or intruding the SCADA system. As the result, incorrect estimate of the smart grid state will be derived due to the false ''measurements''. This will further mislead the control center to make wrong decisions and operations, such as bad real-time electricity pricing and even large-area power failure accidents [9] , [10] .
To tackle with such threats, great attentions have been paid to the identification, filtering, and detection of FDIA [8] - [11] . However, existing FDIA detection methods seldom take the correlation between FDIA and the power system physical parameters into consideration. In fact, the values of physical parameters are closely related to the status of the power system. For instance, under certain initial operating condition, the voltage stability reflects the ability of the power system to return the stable state after suffered from a physical interference [12] .
In this paper, based on analyzing the impact of FDIA on the voltage stability, we present an efficient detection method against FDIA. And the main contributions of our work can be summarized as following: " We describe the FDIA problem with a unified logic for state estimation, and give the formal model of FDIA, which can deal with complex environment of smart grid with high dynamics. Stability Index (NVSI), we also studied the relationship between FDIA and the node voltage stability, which can be used to quantitatively depict the impact of FDIA on the system measurements. " An optimized clustering algorithm is proposed, which takes the topology of the power system, and the values of CSSVC and NVSI as the input, and distributes the potential vulnerable nodes into different classes. " Based on the above, we propose a state forecasting method to make state prediction and detect FDIA. And we perform the simulation in the IEEE 39-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems to verify the efficiency and performance of the proposed scheme. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the related works. In Section III, the preliminaries are given. The node vulnerability level identification method is stated in Section IV. In Section V, based on the results of Section IV, the FDIA detecting method is stated. In Section VI, the performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated. The paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
FDIA, as a typical data integrity attack, is one of the most threatening cyber-attacks in smart grid. It is first presented in [8] . To mitigate this serious vulnerability, many algorithms have been proposed to detect FDIA [13] , such as the geometrically designed residual filter and generalized likelihood ratio test [5] . The cumulative sum (CUSUM) testbased detection mechanism introduced in [14] and [15] is also designed to counter FDIA. Other works [16] , [17] use the machine learning method to deal with the stealthy false data. In [18] , the relationship between the physical characteristics of the power system and FDIA is analyzed, and the vulnerable nodes can be identified. Moreover, how to deploy Precision Measurement Units (PMUs) economically and effectively to assist the state estimator and improve FDIA detection has become a valuable question [19] , [20] . In [21] , a detection method based on PMU is proposed; the authors assume that the measurements in part of the system are guaranteed to be reliable due to the physically protected hardware, for example, the attackers couldn't tamper the protected meters; otherwise it will be detected as an attack and enforce a restraint to the attackers' behavior. With the increasingly interconnected power systems in smart grid, distributed state estimation (DSE) has become an important alternative to the centralized and hierarchical solutions [22] , [23] . In [24] , two new methods of distributed state estimation are proposed, one method uses the incremental mode of cooperation, and the other is based on diffusive interaction pattern. The work [25] apply distributed state estimation (DSE) into fully distributed power systems for the detection of FDIA. Cramer et al. [26] propose a bad data detection method based on an extended distributed state estimation (EDSE). In EDSE, each power system is divided into several subsystems by using graph partition algorithms. Buses are divided into three categories in each subsystem: internal bus, boundary bus and adjacent bus. Simulation results indicate that the EDSE-based method has higher overall detection accuracy than the traditional method. However, the EDSE-based method has lower computation complexity.
Many feasible false data injection attack detection methods have been proposed in existing literatures. In this paper, we analyzed and compared the advantages and disadvantages of these methods. The results are summarized in Table 1 .
Most of the existing detection methods have their respective advantages and disadvantages, and each detection method is generally adapted to one specific scenario. Besides, various methods have been proposed to address the problems of false data injection attacks in Smart Grid. It is one novel approach to utilize the physical parameters of the power system to detect FDIA [18] .
In this paper, inspired by the work [18] , we also study the relationship between the physical parameters of the power system and FDIA. Only one physical parameter is taken into consideration in [18] , while multiple physical parameters are analyzed together in our work. In [18] , all nodes are identified the level of vulnerability, which can needs much computational cost. While, in our work, only some of key nodes, the reactive compensation leading nodes, will be considered for vulnerability level identification, which can reduce the computational cost significantly and is more suitable for large scale power system. In addition, we propose an efficient FDIA detection method based on the results of vulnerable nodes identification.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, all important notations are listed. The state estimation in power system is introduced. Next, the control of voltage stability and the node voltage stability index are briefly discussed.
A. NOTATIONS
The important notations used in this paper are listed in Table  2 . 
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION 1) STATE ESTIMATION
State estimation is of vital significance in connecting measurements collected via the communication network and controlling the physical operations in a smart grid. Using the redundancy of real-time measurement system to improve the data accuracy, the state estimation automatically eliminates the error information caused by random interferences, estimate or predict system operating state. The main task of the state estimators is conducted in a control center with the following three main functions: 1) Improving the accuracy of data measurements. The noise and disturbance in data acquisition and transmission may cause data error. Using state estimation, the best estimate of the system status can be got. 2) Detecting and identifying the bad data. Then, delete or correct bad data, and improve the reliability of the data measurements. 3) Forecasting the future trend and possible state of the system. The forecast data enriches the contents of the database, and provides the necessary conditions for the safety analysis and operation planning. The procedure of state estimation is shown in Fig. 2 . The states in smart grid usually include the voltage magnitude and the bus phase angles. In this paper, the state vector is denoted by v. If a system contains n buses, the state vector will be written as:
Where v i indicates the state variable at the i-th bus, usually includes the voltage angle or voltage amplitude.
Take measurement vector z into account. For a system contains n buses, the measurement vector is denoted as z ∈ R m×1 , m>2n-1.Then, z should be:
For nonideal sensors, there exsit some errors between measurement function values and actual measurement values. Take measurement errors into account, state estimation in actual electric power system can be described as:
Here, v is the state vector, e is the Gaussian error noise with a zero mean and a covariance matrix e and h(v) is the theoretical calculation of measurement z. We all know that h(v) is used to describe Alternating Current (AC) power system. So it is a set of nonlinear functions of the state variables. However, if the load flow equations submitted to Direct Current (DC) approximations, h(v) would be a set of linear functions. Hence, the DC power model for the real power measurements can be represented in a compact vectormatrix form as:
where
is an invariable Jacobi matrix. State estimation aims to find an estimated value of v, denoted by v . v is the optimal solution for the equation z = Hv + e. The Weighted Least Squares Algorithm is often used to solve such problems. The form of state estimation is transformed into a quadratic optimization problem:
And the estimated linearized state vector v' is given by
, and then the measurement residuals ψ can be expressed as:
The Weighted Least Squares estimation method takes the minimum square residual as the objective function f . Most of the existing detection methods are based on the Chi-square test or the Residual test. Taking Chi-square test as an example, the identification basis of this method is shown in Table 3 , where v is a vector of estimation state variable and τ is a threshold [8] . The definition of the constant τ is a key issue. Assuming that all the variables are mutual independent and that the measuring errors follow the normal distribution, z − Hv 2 will follow Chi-squared distribution, whose degree of freedom is m-n. 
2) FDIA
Bad data is generated due to the random errors of measurements, while false data is deliberately constructed by the malicious attackers. Traditional bad data detection method in state estimation work efficiently for detecting bad data, but it is ineffective for detecting FDIA. Under FDIA, the falsified data b is maliciously injected into the power flow measurement vector as:
The observed measuring zf is represented as
And the injected false data vector is
Then, z f will be equaled with
When there exist false data injected by some attackers, b will be a nonzero vector.
The estimation state variable v will be changed into v F due to the injected false data and there is v F = v +c, where c is an n-dimensional and nonzero vector. Assuming that the injected data vector z f equals to Hc, b will be ignored by the traditional detection method as mentioned above. This is because
Thus FDIA is able to escape from traditional detections.
C. CSSVC
CSSVC is the control signal from the controller to the Static Var Compensator (SVC), which is used to support reactive power compensation and voltage control of the corresponding nodes. SVC is with a complicated higher-order nonlinear model, and it is usually controlled by the Proportion Integral Differential (PID) controller. So CSSVC can be calculated by PID algorithm, which is shown as follows,
When the power system works in normal status, the voltage of each node will only float in a small range (±5%) around the rated value. In (13), U i is the deviation between the voltage magnitude of node i and its rated value. The first part contains the current status information in the voltage control process; the second integral part contains the past status information; and the differential part contains the future status information. To sum up, CSSVC reflects the fluctuation of voltage in the power system.
When the power grid is under FDIA, the voltage of relevant nodes will fluctuate for a period of time, so there will exist deviation between the voltage magnitude of these nodes and their rated value. The controller will be triggered by the voltage deviation to send abnormal high CSSVC to the control center, and the system administrator can analyze the abnormal data to locate the fault point.
With the increasing complexity of the higher voltage level and network structure, voltage stability control is becoming more difficult. In this work, the method for partitioning the power system at the voltage stability critical point is adopted [31] , which is proved effective to solve the voltage control problem of complex power grid. In each partition, the appropriate reactive compensation node is selected according to the sensitivity analysis. SVC is installed in these reactive power compensation leading nodes, and more details is stated in Section IV-C.
D. NVSI
Voltage stability is an important concern for power systems. NVSI is one of the key factor regarding voltage stability, which can reveal the real-time status of voltage stability and help to prevent the occurrence of voltage collapse accidents [32] . It has been found that the main advantages of using NVSI are its accuracy in modeling and calculating, and ease of measurement in real time or on-line applications. The values of NVSI alert us the existence of vulnerable nodes. These vulnerable nodes may cause the system instability. When the system load parameter is close to collapse critical value, NVSI values may also take effect. Administrators can use NVSI values on-line to monitor the system stability and even make the prediction. Based on NVSI values, administrators can take proper action to prevent voltage collapse. So, in this paper, we identify the vulnerable nodes by means of the CSSVC and NVSI at first, and then perform the detection for FDIA at each node according to the vulnerability level.
In our scheme, we use the method presented in [32] for calculating the NVSI of each reactive power compensation leading node in the power system, as follows,
The NVSI only needs measurements information about nodes, which can be easily obtained from the synchronized PMUs or the existing state estimator of EMS at control centers. It can be calculated in a very short time so that it can be applied in real-time or on-line environment.
In (14), NVSI (N i ) is the voltage stability index at the node i, U j is the voltage magnitude of node j. P i , Q i are the summation of the real power and reactive power. Besides, R is the resistance of branch. X is the reactance of branch. We can obtain R and X from the power network electric topological database. By doing a successful power flow solution, all parameters of (14) can be obtained, and the NVSI of each reactive power compensation leading node can be calculated in short order.
IV. NODE VULNERABILITY LEVEL IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we use the CSSVC and NVSI to analyze the impact of FDIA. We use an optimization algorithm to distinguish which nodes are tend to be attacked, which can help the administrator to locate the injected points. The details are as follows.
A. THE INFLUENCE OF FDIA ON CSSVC
For the real-time control system, CSSVC can be transmitted to the control center through the communication network. However, if an attacker has launched FDIA, the state variables such as voltage of reactive compensation nodes might be changed. We analysis the voltage control system as a close loop system and take the tampered state variable as the feedback, as shown in Fig. 3 . After being attacked, the true value of the node voltage U i measured by the system is replaced by false data U i , which leads to a deviation U i between the voltage magnitude of node i and its rated value U rated . The deviation U i triggers PID controller, and PID controller produces the CSSVC. SVC accepts a false command and changes the true node voltage.
We take IEEE 39-bus system as an example for simulation. Due to space limitation, we display voltage fluctuations for only one of the reactive power compensation nodes under FDIA. From Fig. 4 we can see that after FDIA, the true value of the node voltage varies with the false value. We compare the values of CSSVC before and after attack in Table 4 . In general, the more intensive the voltage fluctuation is, the larger the CSSVC is. The weaker the voltage fluctuation is, the smaller the CSSVC is. 
B. THE INFLUENCE OF FDIA ON NVSI
The system operation data can be obtained in realtime or extended real-time operation easily. For instance, the operation data can be obtained from synchronized PMUs or the existing state estimator of EMS at control center. However, if some or all of the measurements are accessible for an attacker, these measurements will be modified and injected by false data. Once the measurements are tampered, the real and reactive power measurements P i , Q i and U j will be changed, and the value of NVSI will change correspondingly. In general, the smaller the NVSI is, the better the system node voltage stability is; the greater the NVSI is, the worse the system node voltage stability is. In the worst condition, the node voltage will collapse when it approaches the system voltage collapse critical point. So, the system administrator should be vigilant to the vulnerable nodes and keep the system from FDIA attacks or the verge of instability.
We try to imitate the attackers who inject the false data and tamper the measurements. In the simulations, we assume that the state variable P i , Q i and U j are gradually and proportionally increased to stress the system with a constant factor §, which can be seen as the attack intensity. For each state variable in the power system, we use § times its real estimate as the injected error. § is set to 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3 respectively, and the results of IEEE 14-bus system and IEEE30-bus system are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 . Here, §=1 indicates that there is no attack. From the two figures, we can see that the value of NVSI increases as the attack intensity § increases, which reflects that the node becomes unstable.
C. THE METHODS OF IDENTIFYING THE NODE VULNERABILITY LEVEL
According to the CSSVC and NVSI values of all reactive power compensation nodes, we can identify the vulnerable nodes in the power system preliminarily. Therefore, the vulnerable nodes can easily trigger an emergent remedial action scheme to remind the administrator to detect the FDIA and take appropriate measures to protect the system. It is worth thinking how to identify these vulnerable nodes in the power system. Next, we will analyze our methods.
According to the similarity between different data sources, clustering algorithms can classify the data sources into different clusters. If clustering the vulnerable nodes with larger value of NVSI and higher CSSVC into the same cluster, it will not be hard to distinguish these vulnerable nodes, which can help the administrator to identify the injected data roughly.
The k-means clustering is popular in datamining field. It is a vector quantization method developed from signal processing. However, its defiect is that it randomly selects K points as the initial cluster centroids at the beginning, and it is easily trapped in the local optimum. We adopt a valid method to get better clustering results. The improved k-means clustering based on the particle swarm optimization (PSO) is efficient to obtain the quality cluster centroids initially. The steps of the method are as follows:
Step 1). Algorithm initialization K nodes are selected randomly as the initial center of clustering. The encoding of particle i is expressed as follows:
The position encoding of the particle i is expressed as follows:
Where X θ j represents the θ j th cluster centroid calculated by particle par(i).
The velocity encoding of the particle is expressed as follows:
The location of a particle corresponds to the set of K cluster centers.
Step 2). Fitness calculation
According to the clustering algorithm criteria, the definition of the fitness of par(i) in swarm is as equation below:
Where M p is the input size of clustering algorithm.
Step 3). If the iteration number reaches the maximum limitation, then turn to Step 8, if not, turn to
Step 4.
Step 4). Store the best centroids
If par(i) gets a smaller fitness, store the particle as the individual optimal solution p id . The position of particle with the minimum fitness among all the particles is stored as p gd .
Step 5). Swarm regeneration
The position updating algorithm is as follows: 
par(i).loc[] = par(i).loc[] + par(i).vel[] (20)
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Step 6). Inertia weight regeneration
According to the following equation to renew the inertia weight ς :
Where iter is the present iteration number, and iter max is the maximum limitation of iteration number, ς max = 1,. ς min = 0
Step 7). If the global best of the swarm, p gd , keep stable for a number of iterations, turn to Step 8; if not, turn to
Step 3.
Step 8).
Use the traditional k-means algorithm to complete the clustering program.
We summarize the total steps of the vulnerable node identification procedure as follows:
1) READ THE SYSTEM DATA AND CALCULATE THE NVSI OF EACH REACTIVE POWER COMPENSATION LEADING NODE Usually, the system administrator can easily obtain the power data from synchronized PMUs or the existing state estimator of EMS at the control center. So it is convenient to calculate the NVSI quickly. The CSSVC is transmitted to the control center in real time. In our work, we use the test data obtaining from the power simulation package, MATPOWER [33] . And we calculate the NVSI of two IEEE standard test systems, IEEE 39-bus and IEEE 118-bus.
2) OBTAIN THE HIGH-QUALITY CLUSTERING CENTROIDS FROM IMPROVED ALGORITHM, AND CLUSTER THE SYSTEM NODES INTO DIFFERENT CLASSES
In this procedure, we set K = 3, which means that we will cluster all nodes into three different classes. Most importantly, if we want to get better cluster results, we need three better centroids firstly and each centroid obtained from the PSO algorithm. Then, the high-quality centroids will be used as the real initial cluster centroids to perform the standard k-means algorithm again and cluster the reactive compensation nodes into three classes according to their CSSVC and NVSI, each of the classes represents one different vulnerability level.
3) IDENTIFY THE NODES VULNERABILITY LEVEL OF DIFFERENT CLASSES
In order to identify the vulnerable nodes, we use each of the classes to represent one vulnerability level. For example, the Level.1 indicates the most vulnerable level with higher value of CSSVC and higher value of NVSI, the Level.2 indicates vulnerable level and the Level.3 indicates the stable level, respectively. Therefore, we can easily identify the vulnerable nodes according to the different nodes vulnerability levels.
We conduct experiments using the measurements at the moment t in the IEEE 39-bus and IEEE 118-bus. Firstly, we try to inject the false data into the measurements of some nodes and then calculate the NVSI of each reactive power compensation leading node quickly. Secondly, we get PID output of these nodes at moment t. Then, it is easy to cluster all reactive power compensation leading nodes into three classes and determine the vulnerability level of these nodes by the improved algorithm proposed above. The simulation results of the two standard systems are shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 . In order to make it easier to observe, we use different colors to distinguish the node vulnerability levels. Specifically, the red color represents the most vulnerable level, After the vulnerable nodes are found, the administrator can treat them as the suspicious false data injection attacks targets. Then, they should take a precise detection measures immediately.
V. DETECTING FDIA
In Section IV, the most vulnerable nodes are recognized. It is expected to decrease the cost of detecting FDIA greatly since the recognized vulnerable nodes that are the most suspicious targets of FDIA will be checked preferentially.
Next, we propose a FDIA detection method named State Forecasting Detection (SFD), in which two steps are included.
Step 1 (Measurement Forecasting): It needs to get the real measurement and the forecasted measurement of a specific moment. The forecasted measurement is got based on the short-term forecasting technology. The short-term forecasting technologies have been used in many fields [35] , [36] . Based on the historical measurements, the next measurement can be forecasted. The short-term prediction methods include statistical regression method, time series method, neural network method, etc. In our scheme, the auto-regressive model is adopted for FDIA detection. Consider two consecutive moments t − 1 and t, using the measurement z t−1 of t − 1 moment, we can estimate the measurement − → z t of t moment. We can also get the measurement z t of t moment.
The details of step 1 is as follows.
where G t−1 is the state transition matrix, v t−1 is the estimated state value and Q t−1 is the nonzero diagonal matrix at t − 1 moment. Considering two sampling time t − 1 and t, we calculate the forecasting measurements of time t as: At time t, we obtain the measurement vector z t , and detect the FDIA by verifying the consistence of the measurements and the forecasting measurements. The premise of the prediction is the assuming that the system measurements at t − 1 moment are not under any attack. That is, the state variable v t−1 is not under attack.
Step 2 (Detecting FDIA): Using − → z t and z t as the input,
where H 0 is the null hypothesis and H 1 is the alternative hypothesis. R is diagonal covariance matrix of the measurement. τ is the detection threshold. If H 0 is true, no attack is being found; on the contrary, if H 0 is false, there exists FDIA. The proposed detection method is verified effective and accurate in IEEE 39-bus and IEEE 118-bus power system.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The simulation environment is set up using MATPOWER [33] , and the test data is obtained from it. We construct the false data vectors using the similar way as [14] . After vulnerable nodes are recognized, we compare the SFD with two traditional methods for detecting FDIA on vulnerable nodes, Largest Normalized Residue (LNR) method and the Object Detection J (v) method. For J (v) is the most widely used method for FDIA detection; and the proposed SFD method is proposed based on LNR method. In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , the detecting results in IEEE 39-bus system and IEEE 118-bus system are shown. It can be seen that the detection rate increase with the false alarm probability gradually. From Fig. 9 , it can be seen in IEEE 39-bus system, when the percentage of the attacked measurements is low, the three methods are not effective for detection. No matter how large the percentage is, the three methods cannot detect all the attacks. That is because the system is not large enough so that the changes of FDIA on the system is not very obvious. Among the three methods, the proposed SFD has a higher detection rate at the same attack percentage. From Fig. 10 , it can be seen in IEEE 118-bus system, when the percentage of attacked measurements is low, all the three methods can detect a small part of attacks. With the increase of the attack percentage, the detection rates of the three methods increase. When all the measurements in the system are under attack, the detection rate of SFD can reach 90%. From Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 , we find that SFD have higher accuracy and higher detection rate. On the other hand, we compare two different systems and find that there is a higher detection rate and accuracy in larger systems. In a word, the effectiveness of SFD is verified by the simulation.
VII. CONCLUSION
To deal with the problem of FDIA in smart grid, which may lead to wrong decision makings in power dispatch or electric power market operations, we propose an efficient FDIA detection scheme based on power system physical parameters. Firstly, we analyze the power system and investigate the CSSVC and NVSI to identify the vulnerability level of nodes in the power system. As the result, we define three levels to cluster the nodes into three swarms. In the progress of clustering, we use an improved cluster algorithm for nodes clustering. This step helps us to find the suspicious false data injection nodes easily. Then we use the state forecasting method to obtain the states of power system. In addition, the results based on state forecasting detection methods are used to find the sensitive measurement vectors. In the simulation, we built different types of attack vectors, which gives us sufficient experimental results. Finally, the simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can effectively detect FDIA in smart grid. In future work, we will verify the proposed scheme in larger system, such as IEEE 300-bus and IEEE 1354-bus system. 
